Ode sur la superstition Voltaire 1732
It is only from the seventeenth century that we can identify the beginnings of a continuous European engagement with China and the Asia-Pacific littoral. (Pinot 1932; Gernet 1985: 3; Spence 1985) From the outset the encounter assumed an essentially missionary character. The first serious attempts to offer an idea of China emerge in the accounts of the Jesuit missions to Beijing and Canton beginning with that of Matteo Ricci at the end of the sixteenth century. This Jesuit account evolved gradually in the course of the seventeenth century, but it was through it that we get both an initial idea of China and a European reaction to it. As Jacques Gernet observes, 'it was under the influence of their own educations as Europeans' that these missions 'made their judgements on China' (Gernet 1985: 6) . What, then, was the Jesuit view of China and what impact did it have upon European political consciousness in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries?
The first Jesuit mission of Fathers Ricci (1582 Ricci ( -1610 and Michele Ruggieri drew attention not only to the antiquity of China but also to its philosophy and its superstitions. Nicolas Trigault, the leader of the second Jesuit mission, published Ricci's 
views in his Histoire de l'expedition chrétienne au royaume de la Chine entrepris par les PP de la Compagnie de Jesus comprise en cinque livres . . . tirée des commentaires du
Thus the initial reception of the earliest accounts of Jesuit missionaries radicalized European self understanding. They inspired an interrogation of the authenticity of the Old Testament, upset conventional exegesis and threatened the traditional European understanding of history. Clearly such revelations demanded further inquiry into the nature of Chinese law and the character of their ancient institutions. For, if Chinese civilization dated back to Noah, its ancient works might more accurately reflect the morality practiced by the chosen people before the Flood. Its sacred texts, moreover, might shed further light on the mystery of the creation. Subsequent Jesuit sinology suggested that the Chinese could be practicing a system of belief that would not be inherently antithetic to Christianity and which merely required amplification by the revelation of Christ's death and God's Grace. In sum, the translation of Chinese texts together with explicatory commentaries by Jesuits like Couplet, Martini and subsequently Le Comte and Du Halde, which came to constitute the primary sources for the European understanding of China, depicted the Chinese as an ancient civilization with a notion of heaven (tian guo) and God (shang di) who could by a process of Jesuit inspired accommodation be syncretized into a Christian eschatology.
This 'Confucian-Christian synthesis' consistently promulgated by the Jesuits from the late sixteenth to the early eighteenth century (Mungello 1988: 254) however, aroused, or more accurately, revived suspicion of Jesuit ethical practice that had troubled both the Catholic and Protestant moral conscience since the late sixteenth century in Europe. Indeed, China became the curious mis en scene for a continuing theological battle about the understanding of revelation and grace that had haunted Europe since the Reformation. In France, it culminated in an acerbic dispute over the Chinese ceremonies or 'rites' that culminated with the condemnation in the first decade of the eighteenth century of several Jesuit positions.
The conflict initially concerned Jesuit casuistry, but expanded to involve considerations of the 'philosophic' sin and the utility of the Jesuit strategy towards an ultimately pagan culture. It had been central to the post-Tridentine vocation of the Jesuits that they constituted a missionary order. They were, milites Christii, but they were not to martyr themselves unnecessarily. In order to preserve the faith, therefore, their 'probabilist' casuistry that permitted equivocation also facilitated a strategic accommodation to local circumstances especially when confronted by a hostile power.
The sixteenth century Jesuit missions to Asia, that followed in the wake of first Portuguese and subsequently French attempts to exploit the spice routes to the East Indies, took with them these controversial ethical tactics first practiced in Protestant Europe. The first missions, Xavier's to Goa and Macao and subsequently Ricci's to China, realized that to be effective they had to win the support of local pagan rulers. Following Ricci's advice, the Jesuits deliberately cultivated the Chinese literati in order to promulgate the faith (Spence 1985; Mungello 1989) .
In China such a strategy seemed peculiarly appropriate because, unlike the superstitious common people who followed the 'Bonzes', the Imperial Court and the mandarin intelligentsia practiced the rule of reason, worshipped heaven and followed a Confucian morality that the Jesuits maintained could be adapted to Christianity (Pinot 283-313; Gernet 1985: 40) . From the first Jesuit mission of Ricci, the Jesuits deliberately promulgated an image of the rational Chinese literati (Rule 1986: 50-8) . Subsequently, Father Louis Le Comte (1696) contended that the Jesuits might make use of any methods that human prudence offered in order to advance the faith in China. Hence Jesuits skilled in Mathematics, like Adam Schaal, 'had most advanced the cause of religion in China' (Pinot: 47) by astonishing the Imperial Court with their accurate calculation of solar and lunar eclipses. In order to convert the Literati, moreover, the Jesuits had, they contended, first to assimilate Chinese doctrine in order to persuade the Chinese intelligentsia of the truths of revealed religion. Thus, between 1687 and 1688, the Jesuit Fathers Incoretta, Herdtrich, Rougement and Couplet published their Confucius Sinarum Philosophus sive Scientia Sinensis Latine Exposita 'one of the supreme achievements of Jesuit accommodative scholarship in China' (Mungello 1989: 247) . This translation of the four Confucian classics namely The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, The Analects and the Mencius constituted the cumulation of a century of Jesuit investigation into Confucianism and made it available to a European readership.
The first Jesuit sinologists, moreover, deliberately used 'the spiritual ambiguity of the ancient Chinese and early Confucian tradition to forge a sympathetic treatment of the Confucian literati' (Mungello 1989: 249) . Their efforts subsequently constituted both a source for future missions and evidence to European readers of the humanistic moral and political philosophy of Confucianism (Rule 1986: 122) .
In the first decades of the eighteenth century the French Jesuit Rule 185) . These works transmitted a generally positive picture of Chinese ethical practice for European consumption, in order to defend the Jesuit policy of accommodation. Jesuits, like Couplet, further asserted that the missions could accommodate Confucianism because it was essentially a civil morality, not a religious code. He went on to argue that the rites performed by the Chinese Emperor were essentially secular and had no particular religious significance. In articulating this view, Couplet only elaborated the position outlined by the first Jesuit mission. Thus, Matteo Ricci had observed that the imperial court possessed 'neither priests nor ministers of religion, neither solemn rites to be guarded, nor precepts or commandments imposed, nor spiritual chiefs charged to declare or promulgate the doctrine and to admonish those that transgress it. Moreover, they do not recite prayers either together or individually. Finally, they believe that the Emperor only must offer homages and sacrifice to the King of Heaven. Their true temple . . . is this Such a view, and the sophistry that it entailed, however, seemed anathema to many non-Jesuits. Significantly, other Catholic missions to the East, like the Société des Missions Étrangers, condemned the Imperial rites as dangerous pagan superstitions. In France, Jansenists like Blaise Pascal and Antoine Arnauld mounted a telling critique of the Jesuit missions and their syncretic practice (Pinot: 94-5). Arnauld averred that the doctrine practiced by the Chinese Emperor sounded even in its Jesuitized rendition like atheism. Alternatively, if there was any substance to Chinese religion, it looked suspiciously like the Deism propounded by Locke and Toland which had found influential supporters amongst the Molinists at the Sorbonne. It consequently followed as Bishop Bossuet, another influential Jesuit detractor, argued that such a doctrine allowed the possibility of salvation without grace. As Bossuet evinced, in a letter to Pope Alexander VII, this constituted the philosophic sin:
Here, indeed, they derive solace from China, blinded by that people and their immense arrogance, they detract from the wisdom of their parents. By their practice grace is questioned. The pagan transgresses nature and deserves eternal punishment, but they deny and excuse them maintaining that ignorance of God and his law does not merit such harsh treatment.
(Ibid)
The eventual outcome of this quarrel over the Chinese Rites saw the Papacy condemning the Jesuit strategy of accommodation in the Bull Ex Illa Dei (1715). Subsequently, Benedict VII's Bull Ex Quo Singularii (1742) more completely denounced the practices of the Jesuit missionaries. Shortly after this, the French Jesuit order was itself temporarily dissolved and the first chapter of Europe's encounter with China came to a close.
This notwithstanding, the Jesuits, in the course of a bitter struggle over the correct method of promulgating the faith, left a collection of reflections and works from which most eighteenth-century speculation about China derived. Moreover, from the perspective of a developing sinology, it is quite clear that the Jesuits went to great lengths to place a favourable construction upon Chinese culture and values. Thus the Couplet production of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus sive Scientia Sinensis (1688), includes a preface that both demonstrates Confucian compatibility with Jesuit religious teaching and presents Confucius as a 'most wise . . . master of moral philosophy' whose practical reasoning governed by the law of nature informed both imperial governance, moral and civil law (Couplet et al. 1687: iii-viii (Pinot 1932: 139) .
Central to this strategy is the view that reason informed Chinese moral practice and that its major sage Confucius was a secular saint guided by its pure light unencumbered by artifice. Indeed, so pure was the reasoning that the Jesuit sinologists placed him in the same league as Socrates. For, his philosophy was 'to obey the Lord of Heaven, to honour and fear him, to love our neighbour as ourselves, never to take our passions for our rule of conduct, to submit to Reason, [and] to listen to it in all things' (Du Halde 1724: 298) .
Biased to justify Jesuit strategy, these sources, nevertheless, provided an abundance of material for philosophic reflection on the nature of government, tolerance, morality and the rule of right reason. Paradoxically, despite the Jesuit promulgation of documents that offered an image of China that justified their missionary strategy, Enlightenment philosophers and scientists discovered in these accounts precisely what the Jesuits denied. In other words, the Enlightenment thinkers of the early and mid-eighteenth century, found in China a model of a moral society governed by natural reason and freed from the superstitious fetters of religion that had imposed a cake of custom on European institutions. French, German and to a lesser extent British philosophers looked to the China represented in the curious and edifying observations of Couplet, Le Comte and Du Halde to confirm the intuition that morality might exist independently of theology and that man could conduct himself and his social relations by a moral science unencumbered by supernatural injunction.
Thus, at the close of the seventeenth century, the German philosopher G. W. Leibniz recognized the utility of the Chinese language and its civil morality for European development (Lach in Ching and Oxtoby 1992: 116). Initially, Leibniz considered the Chinese people the prima gentis and its language the key to a universal language. Leibniz, consequently became instrumental in the emergence of a German philological enterprise dedicated to what Andreas Muller believed he had discovered in the 1670s, namely the clavis sinica or key to the Chinese language. Interestingly the pursuit of an original language root which preoccupied European philology for most of the eighteenth century assumed 'a shared logical and linguistic structure between China and Europe' (Mungello 1989: 246) . Confucius' civic morality, moreover might, Leibniz contended, serve as the basis of a universal moral science. In his scheme for a progressive world civilization Leibniz envisaged an alliance between China and Europe. Consequently, he became interested in the Jesuit missions to China during the 1680s. He communicated extensively with the Jesuit missionaries Bouvet and Grimaldi. In his Novissima Sinica (1697-99) Leibniz proposed a mutually beneficial exchange of ideas between Chinese and European scholars:
And so if we are their equals in the industrial arts, and ahead of them in contemplative sciences, certainly they surpass us (though it is almost shameful to confess this) in practical philosophy, that is, in the precepts ethics and politics adapted to the present life and use of morals. (17) Leibniz identified a Chinese preoccupation with a practical ethics that ramified the moral and political order. Such evidently rational rule particularly appealed to the emerging European Enlightenment intelligentsia. What had most worried the Jansenists in the Jesuit accounts, paradoxically, constituted the basis of China's appeal to Enlightenment rationalists. The paradox is not hard to explain. Leibniz, Locke, Toland and Bayle, in the earlier part of the century, and Hume and Voltaire, from the mid-eighteenth century, sought to escape the enthusiasm and fanaticism of European, Christian, religious fundamentalists through the Enlightenment project of transforming morality into a science. Leibniz, and subsequently, Voltaire, argued that what Europe had only just come to realize through Lockean psychology and Newtonian physics, the Chinese had known from the earliest historical times and had sustained that knowledge through the practical virtue of a Confucianized mandarinate.
In the light of the reported accounts of the efficiency and stability of Chinese rule it consequently seemed obvious to look to China for guidance most specifically in the areas of public morality and government. Confucian precepts could, it was felt, provide a source of guidance to the absolutist governments that had emerged across Europe in the aftermath of the Thirty Years War (1618-48) . The post-1648 solution to the problem of religious difference had been the doctrine of cuis regio eius religio and the further recognition that a strict separation should be maintained between the public and the private realm. Consequently, raison d'état or Hobbesian contract legitimated the absolute ruler taking any action he deemed necessary to maintain the public peace. By the end of the seventeenth century, absolutist thinkers like Bossuet and La Bruyere had established the view that the monarch was a patriach whose interest should nonetheless coincide with that of the people.
Although such a clear separation of politics from morality solved the religious issue, it did not resolve the question of the manner in which the ruler exercised his patriachal right. Frenchmen might agree that L'état was Louis, but they worried about the absence of political morality or a science of government. In the course of the eighteenth century, absolutism became increasingly subject to a Lockean law of public opinion (Koselleck 1988: 53-8) . Freed from religious fundamentalism, the Enlightenment intelligentsia became increasingly vocal critics of the quotidian conduct of increasingly corrupt monarchical rule. French sceptics favourably contrasted the pagan Chinese Emperor's toleration of a new Jesuit mission in 1685 with the moral bankruptcy associated with the cynical Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in the same year .
It was in the context of moralizing the activity of rulers like Louis XIV that Academicians like J. B. Régis noted the rationalism of Chinese rule and its apparent conformity with the principles of Descartes. At the same time another Academician, the devotee of Gassendi, doctor and traveller to the Mogul Empire, François Bernier, derived from Couplet's translation of Confucius, a political science for Princes published in the Journal des Savans (1688). Bernier argued that Confucian precepts taught the prince to have 'no other interest than that of his subjects, loving them, like the good father loves his own children' (Bernier 1688: 25-40) . In this view Confucian precepts were not abstract speculations, but a concrete political science with a practical object. The moral and political maxims that Confucius taught might usefully, in Bernier's view, instruct 'young princes in all the countries of the world'. Bernier's translation interpolated the Couplet translation to emphasize the identity of interest of prince and people and evince that the moral example of the ruler determines the moral conduct of the subject. Thus if the Prince is virtuous 'so will the people be virtuous, if he is not the people will follow this example and abandon themselves to disorder' (ibid). The great principle of government, therefore, was love. The Prince consequently must love what the people love and hate what the people hate. Rule based on this principle, Bernier termed absolutism, not despotism. The excellence of Chinese government consisted in the fact that the Emperor was inculcated with a moral sense from an early age. Chinese absolutism in consequence required no constitutional law as it adhered to moral principle.
Interestingly, this positive view of Chinese rule differed profoundly from Bernier's far more captious account of his Travels in the Mogul Empire, where he spent the years between 1656 and 1668. In 'Hindoostan', Bernier maintained, the absence of private property and the tyrannical rule of 'Timonists, Governors and Revenue con-tractors' reduced peasants and artisans to indigence, obstructed commercial activity and impoverished the towns (Bernier 1914: 226-7 The polite arts in this country are subject to as many revolutions as its laws or politics; not only the objects of fancy and dress, but even of delicacy and taste are directed by the capricious influence of fashion (Goldsmith 1762 (Goldsmith (1966 : vol. 2 176-7).
By contrast as his communicant in China Fum Hoam observes:
When I compare the history of China with that of Europe, how do I exult in being a native of that kingdom which derives its original from the sun. Upon opening the Chinese history, I there behold an antient extended empire, established by laws which nature and reason seemed to have dictated. The duty of children to their parents, a duty which nature implants in every breast, forms the strength of that government which has subsisted from time immemorial. Filial obedience is the first and greatest requisite of a state . . . By this the state may be said to resemble one family, of which the Emperor is protector, father and friend. (177) Goldsmith, who elaborated this panegyric from Du Halde's Description, goes on to describe China, through the character of Fum Hoam, as 'this happy region, sequestered from the rest of mankind' that witnessed a 'succession of princes who in general considered themselves as the fathers of their people; a race of philosophers who bravely combated idolatry, prejudice and tyranny at the expense of their private happiness and immediate reputation' (ibid).
Voltaire in plays like Orphelin de la Chine (1755), also adapted from a report in Du Halde, his Essai sur les Moeurs (1756) and his Philosophy of History (1765) dedicated to the Russian Empress Catherine, made a similar point. The Chinese, he wrote, had 'brought morality to perfection which is the first of the sciences.' Indeed, 'their vast and populous empire was governed like a family whose monarch was the father . . . while we were wandering in the forests of the Ardennes.' (Voltaire n.d.: 399) Religion and morality in China was, of course, like Voltaire's own, 'wise, august, free from all superstition and all barbarity.' Thus, the rational religion of the Emperors was never sullied by imposture or 'burdened with absurd innovations which are supported one against another by arguments as absurd as themselves, the rage of which has at length placed the poignard in the hands of fanatics led on by factions.' (Ibid) In their detached tolerance, Voltaire maintains, with obvious reference to the political and religious discord in Europe, 'the Chinese are particularly superior to all nations of the universe' (400; see also Pocock 1999: 102-7).
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For Voltaire, like Bernier before him, believed China's moral superiority resided in its Confucian practical wisdom. Confucius' peculiar virtue lay in the fact that 'he framed neither new opinion nor new rites. He neither pretended to be an inspired man nor a prophet. He was a magistrate who taught the ancient laws. We sometimes say very improperly, "the religion of Confucius", [yet] he had no other than that of the first sages, he recommends nothing but virtue, [and] preaches no mysteries' (ibid). Centrally, Voltaire contended, Confucianism recognized the intimate connection between the character of the ruler and the capacity to rule. Thus 'in order to learn to govern, we should pass our whole life in correcting ourselves.' By practicing an 'exact policy' consistently, the Chinese Emperors had transcended fluctuating opinions, factions and fashion. The people consequently learnt to 'fear a law always present' rather than demand new laws 'in the future'. Such precise rule, in Voltaire's judgement, was efficient but not oppressive.
Consequently, in The Chinese Catechism (1764), a dialogue between a scholar and a prince, Voltaire has the Confucian scholar, Cau, observe, 'toleration you know is the principle of the Chinese and indeed of Asiatic government.' His prince continues, 'by the law of Nature everyone may believe what he will, as well as eat what he will. A physician is not to kill his patients for not observing the diet he has prescribed to them; neither has a sovereign a right to hang his subjects for not thinking as he thinks; but he has a right to prevent disturbances and with prudent measures he will very easily root out superstitions of all kinds.' (Voltaire 1764 (Voltaire (1936 With both Goldsmith in England, Christian Wolff in Germany and Voltaire in France as well as in the work of lesser known writers of the classical age of Enlightenment like Misson and Argens, China serves a critical literary, historical, moral, economic and political purpose. The wise Chinese sage, in the political or historical treatise, travel novel, letter, or dialogue, draws attention to a rational and correct moral and political order that contrasted favourably with the weakness, corruption and superficiality of contemporary European politics, manners and morals. It also provided the model for enlightened reformation. China represented an absolutist society perfectly ordered according to reason and organized around a monarch whose only interest was that of the public. The myth of China and Chinese virtue, whatever the actual merits of its society, enabled Enlightenment moralists to sustain a practical critique of contemporary European politics. Such criticism, moreover could be presented subtly, seeking not to undermine despotism, but merely to enlighten it. Utopia, the philosophes contended could be realized through 'innoculer l'esprit du Chine' (Pinot: 9).
The apotheosis of Chinese influence on European moral, political and especially economic thought, however, came not in the political writings of Voltaire, or Christian Wolff, but in the political economy of François Quesnay. Surgeon to Mme De Pompadour, Quesnay exercised a considerable influence in the court of Louis XV. In the course of the 1750s, Quesnay developed the theory of physiocracy, or the economic understanding that all wealth derived from land. This theory profoundly affected the subsequent development of economic thought. In Le Despotisme en Chine (1767) Quesnay claimed to derive this physiocratic understanding from a close study of Chinese economic and governmental practice and elaborated from it a fully integrated theory of enlightened despotism. Like his fellow philosophes, Quesnay found in China the model of a perfectly regulated state. (Quesnay 1767 (Quesnay (1946 vol. 2: 109-38). Yet Quesnay further discerned in Chinese agricultural and administrative practice, a rational society that conformed to the physiocratic laws of nature and formed a model for all political order. 'A systematic digest, worthy to be used as a model for all states' (vol. 2: 264).
Quesnay maintained that a natural order composed of physical and moral laws affected all human activity. The physical law, he asserted, 'regulated the progress of every physical event advantageous to the human race, whereas the moral, constitutive law regulated all moral action' (ibid: 264-5). These laws formed the moral and political basis of government. Given this natural determinism, Quesnay contended that the body politic demanded a tutelary authority to govern by positive laws that reflected or confirmed this 'irrefragable' natural order.
Such an authority could not be arbitrary. Constitutional systems that mixed or balanced political authority or that gave exclusive power to the people, the elite or the monarch were in Quesnay's view inadequate. Such authority would become partial, self-interested and facilitate, not a true reflection of the natural order, but discord. Properly understood, rule required 'a unique and impartial authority', (268) united 'under a head who alone holds the executive power and the power of compelling all citizens to the observance of the laws, of assuring the rights of all against all, of the weak against the strong, of preventing and suppressing unjust encroachments and usurpations' (ibid).
In Quesnay's view, therefore, a truly enlightened despot constituted the 'immovable foundation of the perfect government'. Such a style of rule offered the enticing prospect of constant supervision of the 'economic order of the nation'. The physiocratically informed despot conscious of his responsibility to the natural order, would see that 'his interest' properly understood 'always agrees with that of the nation'. Aware of the scientific basis of this relationship the despot and his tribunals continuously assess the impact that positive law might have upon the natural physical laws 'which affect the annual reproduction of the wealth of the nation' (271). European governments, monarchical or republican, had, in Quesnay's view, neglected the scientific study of wealth. Instead of applying physiocratic theory, European monarchs undermined both political stability and the agricultural production upon which it rested by arbitrary taxation. By contrast, the Chinese, who had pioneered physiocracy, taxed only a proportion of the net product of the land. The enlightened Chinese Emperor studied the natural physical order and framed appropriate laws in accordance with the natural circulation of wealth.
An enlightened European governor would, therefore, study Chinese practice. The despot must become a skilled manager of the national product. This required the sedulous application of reason's latest tool that 'great science . . . that underlies the government of nations', namely economics. As Quesnay noted, this science, newly developed in Europe, had been taught immemorially in China to the Confucian literati. This virtuocracy thus corresponded to the good gardener who 'must remove the moss that injures the tree, but he must avoid cutting into the bark through which this tree receives the sap that makes it grow' (274). The Chinese, like the physiocrats, agreed that all positive or man made law derived from and depended upon the natural order. Any conflict between the two caused instability, whereas their harmonization ensured 'rewards'. It was not, therefore, 'special circumstances' that had ensured 'the perpetuity of Chinese government' but 'an inherently stable order' that consistently reflected the natural order. Ultimately, Quesnay concluded that:
Ignorance is always the principal cause of the most disastrous errors of government, of the ruin of nations, and of the decadence of empires, from which China has always been so securely preserved by the ministry of the scholars, who occupy the foremost rank in the nation and who are as attentive in guiding the people by the light of reason as in subjecting the government clearly to the natural and immutable laws which constitute the essential order of nations. (304) Quesnay's work and that of the physiocrat school deeply influenced later eighteenth century political and economic thought. Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations referred to the influential 'sect' of French economists, and both Parson Malthus and David Hume commented critically on their works (Smith (1776 (Smith ( ) 1964 . Mirabeau in his funeral oration maintained that Quesnay's theory of wealth was 'one of the three great inventions that have given stability to political science since the world began' (ibid). The fashionable cult of the enlightened despot that the physiocrats inspired even led impressionable European monarchs to imitate the rites of the Chinese Emperor. The Dauphin features in a number of paintings of the late eighteenth century holding a model plough, whereas the more completely enlightened Hapsburg Emperor, Joseph II, actually took up ploughing to indicate his physiocratic enlightenment.
Eighteenth century critics of virtuous China
At the end of the eighteenth century in Germany, the United Kingdom and especially in France there existed, then, a positive understanding of Chinese civilization. Both the Jesuit and rationalist inspired images of China were politically influential and fashionable. Not only did Goldsmith and Voltaire write satires and plays drawn from Chinese themes, the cognoscenti embraced the cult of Chinoiserie, they drank tea from China cups, decorated their houses with Adam wallpaper or Fragonard paintings depicting Chinese pastoral scenes and constructed Gardens, like the Royal Botanical Gardens at Kew, according to the Chinese style complete with pagoda and ornamental lake. (Reichwein 1925) . Catherine the Great even built a complete model Chinese village. Although less advanced in science and medicine, China, for the European Enlightenment, constituted a source of tolerance, taste and political and economic utility, untainted by the corrosive poison of religious fanaticism. Moreover, its economic and moral thought intimated a physiocratic science of rule that Europeans had only inchoately grasped. What Europe discovered in Chinese government was stability, a cult of reason, efficient agriculture based on an economic science and a moral practice which rendered crime and indigence virtually unknown. Such an estimation suggests neither a narrow minded xenophobia, nor grounds for colonization. It might, however, suggest a one-sided depiction of China and its cultural legacy. What we might ask happened to alter or reverse this favourable eighteenth century image of enlightened China?
There was in fact from at least the late seventeenth century a countervailing interpretation that questioned both the Jesuit and subsequently the early Enlightenment interpretation of the rationality of Chinese language government and morality. As early as 1668 John Wilkins of the Royal Society, while acknowledging the Chinese language 'much talked of', considered it 'strangely complicated . . . difficult' and 'exceedingly equivocal'. It thus constituted an 'imperfect' basis for a universal philosophical language (Wilkins 1668: 10, 450) . From a moral perspective, Jansenists like Antoine Arnauld and Eusebe Renaudot viewed not only the Jesuit strategy of conversion, but also their reports with a high degree of suspicion. In his Anciennes Relations des Indes et de la Chine (1718) Renaudot criticized Confucian ethics for being mere 'rules of experience' uninformed by any 'abstract principle or transcendental imperative'. He writes, It is difficult to understand how one can admire a morality and a politics which has no principles, but which consists only in some vulgar sentences and examples extracted from history and without any examination of the actions and human passions of motives and ends. Indeed, it is certain that the Chinese have no fixed opinions on the immortality of the soul and are convinced that the recompense for good actions and the punishment of evil ones occur in this life.
(Pinot: 406)
The Chinese, according to the Jansenists, lacked an authentic moral doctrine. This view was shared by both Bishop Berkeley in Ireland and Nicholas Malebranche in France. In his Entretien d'un philosophe chrétien avec un philosophe chinois (1707) Malebranche argued that the Chinese view of li (principle) that occurred in the Zhu zi (Chu Hsi) neo-Confucianist school, was reducible to a notion of reason informing a materialist world. This for Malebranche was atheism. Consequently, he condemned Confucianism for its 'many correspondencies' with 'the impieties of Spinoza'. The sage not only taught arbitrary precepts, he also contributed to atheism (Buckley 1987:153) This captious understanding of Chinese moral practice received additional support from Commander George Anson's account of his A Voyage round the World (1744 (1832)). Although an industrious and ingenious people, Anson's experiences in China led him to conclude that their 'principal excellency seems to be imitation; and they accordingly labour under the poverty of genius ' (in Spence 1997: 55) . For Anson Chinese moral practice and even the artificiality of the language itself constituted a vast confidence trick (Spence: 56).
Anson's account of his trip circulated widely in Europe. It even influenced Louis Secondat the Baron de Montesquieu, whose L'esprit des lois (1748) offered the first systematic repudiation of Chinese ethical and governmental practice. Significantly, prior to formulating the contrasting ethics that informed different forms of rule, Montesquieu had initially shared the dominant early Enlightenment view that Confucian morality and its implementation by a Mandarinate was conducive to the rule of reason (Pinot: 409-10). After 1717, however, Montesquieu rejected the fashionable Enlightenment orthodoxy concerning China. He came instead to prioritize a mixed and balanced polity composed of democratic, aristocratic and monarchical elements, maintained through a judicious separation of powers, that facilitated the principle of virtue. From this perspective, simple despotism, however enlightened, could not provide stability.
China, the despotic ideal type, Montesquieu contended, had experienced at least twenty two dynasties and the seeds of decay were inherent in the system. Thus, each began with 'virtue, attention and vigilance' which prevailed 'in the commencement of the dynasties, and failed in the end.' (Montesquieu 1949: 101) . It naturally followed: that emperors trained up in military toil, who had compassed the dethroning of a family immersed in pleasure should adhere to virtue. . . . But after the three or four first princes, corruption, luxury, indolence and pleasure possessed their successors; they shut themselves up in a palace; their understanding was impaired; their life was shortened; the family declined; the grandees rose up; the eunuchs gained credit; none but children were set upon the throne; the palace was at variance with the empire; a lazy set of people that dwelt there ruined the industrious part of the nation; the emperor was killed or destroyed by a usurper, who founded a family, the third or fourth successor of which went and shut himself up in the very same place.
(Ibid 123)
Despotism also demanded fear, rather than virtue, as its governing principle. The preservation of peace and tranquillity formed the principle object of government. No transcendental consideration informed law and morality only a concern for subordination. Consequently, the empire was 'formed on the plan of the government of a family'. In such a fragile arrangement, 'if you diminish the paternal authority, or even if you retrench the ceremonies that express your respect for it, you weaken the reverence due to magistrates. . . . Retrench but one of these habits and you overturn the state.' The failure to inculcate these habits, moreover, led to anarchy or brutality. Ultimately, 'it was the cudgel that governed China' (123). This preoccupation with order had debilitating moral consequences. The Chinese legal codes emphasized obedience and the need to be industrious, at the expense of personal integrity. In Montesquieu's opinion, Confucian ethics condoned lying and deception. Indeed, the 'Chinese are the greatest cheats upon earth' (ibid).
Compiling his entry on Chinese philosophy for L'encyclopédie, the Enlightenment project par excellence, Denis Diderot was less captious than Montesquieu. Nevertheless, he detected serious defects in the Chinese world view. Concisely reviewing the evidence for and against Confucian morality, Diderot concluded that it was surprising that a people that possessed so much wisdom had not done something to correct the deficiencies of a language that endlessly multiplied an infinity of characters (Diderot 1772 (Diderot (1976 . Ultimately, Diderot found l'ésprit Chinois too complaisant. While China possessed enduring traditions, uniformity of government and durable laws, it lacked the curiosity, spirit of inquiry and sense of dissatisfaction necessary to personal, artistic and scientific progress (ibid: 433).
In an analogously Olympian vein, the Marquis de Condorcet, reviewing The Progress of the Human Mind, contended that a 'priestly caste' ruled China and had undermined its progressive potential. He wrote from his imprisonment in the Bastille, For here we have a people who seem to have outstripped all other nations in the arts and the sciences only to find themselves overtaken by them all in turn; a people who, for all their knowledge of artillery, have been unable to prevent themselves from being conquered by barbarians; a country where knowledge of all the sciences is open to all and represents the only door to advancement, and yet where the sciences, being subject to absurd prejudices, are condemned to an eternal mediocrity. (Condorcet 1795 (Condorcet (1965 Smith's laisser-faire perspective, China had failed to encourage foreign commerce and, in consequence, had stagnated. Adam Smith felt that 'China had long been one of the richest, that is one of the most fertile, best cultivated, most industrious and most populous countries in the world', he also observed that it had been, 'long stationary'. So much was this the case, that 'Marco Polo who visited it more than five hundred years ago describes its cultivation, industry and populousness almost in the same terms as they are described by travellers in the present time' (Smith 1776 (Smith (1964 . Despite conflicting evidence, Smith contended that Chinese labourers received low wages. Although Smith praised China's internal market and the concern with agriculture which ensured 'a full complement of riches . . . consistent with the nature of its laws and institutions', he nevertheless maintained that this complement was 'much inferior to what with other laws and institutions . . . (it) might admit of' (ibid). Because China 'neglects or despises foreign commerce', it could not, 'transact the same quantity of business which it might do with different laws and institutions.' In Smith's opinion, the favourable view of Chinese infrastructure reflected the dubious accounts of 'weak and wandering travellers', and 'stupid and lying missionaries' (Smith vol. 2: 217) . From a related premiss, Malthus further deduced that China suffered from a disabling economic paradox. Calculating wealth on the basis of population, Malthus discovered that although Chinese labourers endured acute poverty, 'China is the richest country in the world without any other.' Nor would society necessarily benefit by an expansion of trade and manufacturing (Malthus 1798: 328-34) . Contra Smith, Malthus maintained, 'that every increase of the stock or revenue of a nation cannot be considered as an increase of the real funds for the maintenance of labour and therefore cannot have the same good effect upon the condition of the poor, will appear in a strong light if the argument be applied to China' (Malthus 1798: 321) . The density of China's population explained this paradox. China was caught in an equilibrium trap. The parson concluded that the 'China Case' exhibited a very high fertility level that kept living standards depressed. (56) Given the poverty of the population and the obscene, but officially condoned, practice of infanticide, Malthus could not understand why the Chinese had not developed colonies to dispose of their surplus population.
Montesquieu's debunking of Chinese practical morality and the laisser faire criticism of Chinese economics cast doubt on the integrity and reliability of Jesuit sources which, between 1573 and 1745, had largely controlled the image of China consumed by an enlightened European readership. From the later eighteenth century, however, the accounts of officially sponsored travellers like de Guignes, embassies like those undertaken by Macartney, Raffles and Crawfurd and subsequently the reports of Protestant missionaries and governors of newly acquired Asian colonies, afforded an alternative and, from the evolving nineteenth century understanding of history, morality, language and economics, a more objective source for the critical evaluation of Far Eastern morality, government and economics.
Summary of the eighteenth century engagement
Central to the Jesuit mission to China was the fact that it adopted a strategy of converting the sect of the Confucian literati (which the Portuguese termed Mandarin). The Jesuit missions found in Confucianism an ethical doctrine of duty that, in the Jesuit view, corresponded to a natural reason which required only the amplification of revelation to make it fully Christian. The practice of the Jesuits was accommodationist and syncretic because Confucian natural morality followed the universal moral principle 'do unto others as thou wouldst be done unto'.
This discovery inspired the attempt to accommodate Confucian practices to Christian ends and bring Confucianism into a Christian dialogue. At the same time it required the rejection of Buddhism as common, superstitious and morally suspect. This controversial strategy had considerable success with both the Ming and Qing mandarinate and the European intellectual elite. However, it conflicted with other missionary strategies both Catholic (Dominican and Franciscan) and subsequently Protestant. As Jacques Gernet observed, the debate made the mistake of 'limiting to one detail which had meaning only within the mental categories of the West, a question of much wider significance: namely whether it was possible to reconcile Christianity with a mental and socio-political system which was fundamentally different from the one within which Christianity had developed' (Gernet 1985: 247) . This propensity, as we shall see, had a tendency to repeat itself in other areas of the Chinese encounter with the West.
In the context of the Chinese rites, the Jansenists particularly criticized Jesuit syncretism. They argued this strategy extended the dubious ethical practices condoned by the Jesuits to avoid persecution in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. Their promotion of Confucianism, moreover, encouraged the heresy of deism and could be further construed as atheistic. For if natural reason could endow a people with a rational moral practice that led both to political stability, just economic distribution, and social coherence, why the need for Christian revelation at all?
The answer to this question particularly appealed to a growing band of European philosophes whose reply 'why indeed?' reflected European disenchantment with the contentious spirit of European religion and a widespread intellectual rejection of religious enthusiasm. In fact, the Enlightenment writers used the increasingly accessible Jesuit accounts of China to reveal a moral and political model suitable for the reform of otiose European institutions. In other words, the first Asian model for European consumption was based on a Confucian political and moral order. Its earthly manifestation was the Chinese Empire. The works of the Jesuit missions suitably adapted for European consumption by Sorbonne propagandists like Du Halde and Couplet transmitted the lineaments of this empire of reason. In so doing they unintentionally furnished the basis for a critique of contemporary European religious, historical, moral, political and educational practice. This criticism in turn demanded a reinvention of government and morality according to a programme of rational rule first outlined by Confucius and developed in political practice by the duty oriented mandarinate of Confucian China. This Enlightenment view of China afforded the vehicle for a rational understanding of moral and ethical practice freed from the superstitious bigotry and enthusiasm of religious fundamentalists that had so disturbed the peace of Europe for two centuries. It also offered the lineaments of a rational science of politics again informed by Confucian principles that would afford a basis both for political order and rational rule. This rationalist approach to rule manifests itself clearly in François Bernier's Science for Princes based on his interpretation of Confucian political ideas. 5 Bernier was particularly attracted in this pre-democratic age to the Confucian understanding of moral government in which rulers and officials have duties that correspond with the exercise of sovereign power. A succession of Enlightenment thinkers subsequently found this an attractive theme. Princes and their advisers must be instructed in the theory, not of divine right, but moral obligation to the people. Just as subjects obeyed, rulers must learn to serve their people. This Enlightenment political understanding culminated in the physiocrat Quesnay's promulgation of China as a physiocratic model for Europe.
This apotheosis of China at the end of the eighteenth century, however, represented the high point of European appreciation of the East. It was, in fact, the failure of enlightenment despotism and its destruction in the course of the French revolution that prompted a reevaluation of the rational perfection of China. The dynamism released at the end of the eighteenth century by its three revolutions American, French and Industrial inspired this process. At the same time, the records of British ambassadors and traders to the Qing Emperor, Qien long, provided new sources for reinterpretation. The Macartney mission to China in 1794, in particular, left a number of highly critical and widely sought accounts of China (Wood 1998: 13) . At the same time as travellers, merchants and ambassadors from France, Holland and the United Kingdom portrayed China and the Chinese in an increasingly critical light, the received version of Chinese government and society received a shattering blow at the hands of a number of developments that profoundly affected the early nineteenth century understanding of philology, history, political and national character and socioeconomic progress.
The new mood is individualistic, liberal democratic, progressive, scientific and above all opposed to the self-incurred tutelage of tradition. European Romanticism added a further contradictory twist to the self determining rationalism that powerfully informs the reformist and revolutionary spirit of the early nineteenth century. The Kantian and post-Kantian Enlightenment of the later eighteenth century, the linguistic discovery of an Aryan root language and the development of romanticism and historicism that emphasized particularism against universalism and authenticity against artificiality, together with the proliferation of utilitarian and Marxist understandings conspired to affect negatively the eighteenth century picture of China. It is to these understandings and their ambiguous impact on the developing image of China that we next turn.
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